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In the years after the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and the subsequent recession,
several empirical studies (including our own) found that collapses in economic
activity tend to occur in the aftermath of large credit expansions.1
These credit expansions—marked by significant
increases in “riskier lending” by banks to consequently
over-indebted households—are supposedly driven
by competitive pressures to lend, and can be exacerbated by perverse incentives or behavioral biases.2
These findings have led some to argue that large credit
expansions in and of themselves are a key cause of
severe economic downturns. However, this common
narrative misinterprets the role that lending plays in
the business cycle. In our research, there is no validity
to the concept of a credit cycle “causing” the business
cycle.3 Despite the novelty of some of the mechanisms
that developed in the run-up to the Great Recession—for example, the collateralizing of subprime
mortgages and the unregulated use of derivatives—it,
like all recessions, was the result of cyclical variations
in economic conditions.
The propensity of banks to engage in riskier lending over the business cycle can therefore be understood
simply as an informed response to outside macroeconomic forces and the impact those forces have on the
most important factor driving bank decision-making:
the bank’s franchise value. Banks benefit from economic rents, and bank franchise value is essentially
the (discounted) value of the entire future stream of

SUMMARY
• This brief offers new perspectives on the behavior of banks
during the financial crisis of 2007-08 and the limited success
of unconventional monetary policies in stimulating bank credit
to the private sector during the subsequent economic recovery.
• The common narrative about the financial crisis is that it was
caused by a large credit expansion with overly risky loangranting behavior by banks. We argue, however, that banks
actually made optimal financial decisions in the lead-up to
the crisis, based on their calculation of their franchise value.
• The brief explains the mechanics of franchise value—how it
led banks to shift their portfolios toward riskier household loans
before the crisis, as well as how it dampened the impact of
quantitative easing and other novel monetary policies meant
to stimulate the investment of capital into the private sector.
• Policymakers have failed to recognize the role that franchise
value plays in all bank decisions. If they wish to devise appropriate fiscal or monetary policies to prevent or mitigate a
future crisis, they need to properly account for how franchise
value drives the decision-making of bank managers.
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these rents. Rent values fluctuate over
time as local and aggregate economic
conditions change, and they are the
result of the spread between banks’
return on assets and their cost of debt.
Although, in practice, rents can arise
simply from a lack of competition
in the banking sector, our research
focuses on rents derived from explicit
government guarantees on bank
deposits (i.e., FDIC deposit insurance). Deposit insurance serves as a
form of subsidized financing for banks
that lowers the cost of their debt
and raises the rents they collect and,
thereby, their franchise value.
The key to this alternative interpretation of bank risk-taking is
understanding that the fluctuations
of a bank’s franchise value over the
business cycle is what motivates all
lending behavior—the good and the
bad. Rather than suffering from irrational exuberance in the years before
the autumn of 2008, bank managers
actually foresaw the risks on the horizon and forecasted future economic
growth appropriately, which enabled
them to make optimal investment and
financing decisions for their equity
shareholders, based on their franchise
value.
As we will outline in this Issue
Brief, policymakers failed to appreci-

ate the role that franchise value plays
in the decisions of banks. They consequently did not anticipate that banks,
in general, actually would hoard
reserves (instead of extending credit)
in response to the extraordinary
measures undertaken by governments
and central banks after the start of the
financial crisis. There is an important
lesson that should be learned here: if
policymakers wish to devise appropriate fiscal or monetary policies to
prevent or mitigate a future crisis, they
need to properly account for the constraints under which bank managers
operate and how franchise value drives
their decision-making.

FRANCHISE VALUE: WHY
BANKS SHIFT THEIR RISKS
During economic expansions,
bank franchise value is generally
large and banks protect it by avoiding excessive risks that may lead to
early bankruptcy. Over time, however,
aggregate risks eventually build, and
franchise values begin to fall as risk
premia rise (see Figure 1). It is at this
point that risk-taking throughout the
banking sector begins to accelerate.
For a brief glimpse into what
this looks like in practice, consider
the following facts regarding banks’
responses to macroeconomic conditions in the 2003–2008 period:

FIGURE 1: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FRANCHISE VALUE AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF DEFAULT
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• Bank leverage, while relatively
low in the early 2000s, increased
steadily from 2004, and then grew
exponentially from 2006 until the
onset of the crisis (see Figure 2).

crisis, benefiting equity holders at the
potential future expense of banks’ debt
holders.
These facts suggest a picture of
increased risk-taking and pessimism

FIGURE 2: MARKET LEVERAGE OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, 1992-2016
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safe assets (e.g., Treasuries and cash)
on their balance sheets until the third
quarter of 2008 (see Figure 3).
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about the future that accelerated
before September 2008. This is not
surprising. As the probability of a
crisis rises above certain thresh-

FIGURE 3: RELATIVE SIZE OF SAFE ASSETS IN BANK PORTFOLIOS, 1992-2019
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• Large bank holding companies
olds, a bank’s incentives change in
were implementing extensive stock
a dramatic way. The probability of a
repurchases in the lead-up to the crisis
shutdown can increase to the point
to bolster their own share prices.4
where avoiding it entirely becomes
TREASURY-TO-ASSETS
RATIO
• Bank dividend payouts
too costly.
In that case, a bank shifts
remained high before and during the
from being a “good bank,” making
3

safe investments and seeking to stay
in business, to being a “bad bank,” in
effect taking advantage of the subsidy
offered to depositors by becoming
over-leveraged. For a bank with low
leverage, the shift does not occur until
the probability of a crisis is as high
as 5%. For a bank with the middle
value (in our sample), it occurs at 2%.
For a bank with the highest leverage,
even the smallest probabilities of crisis
compel it to maintain assets at their
lowest value.5
We can see the same mechanisms
at work in the optimal portfolio allocation of a bank. When the probability of a crisis is low, well-capitalized
banks avoid risky loans to households;
however, poorly capitalized banks will
make those loans. But at a threshold
level, the loan portfolio shifts toward
over-weighting the risky household
loans. This shift occurs at the same
point at which the bank decides to
hold less equity.
What explains the shift from
“good bank” to “bad bank” when the
likelihood of an impending crisis
rises? In a word, franchise value,
which decreases as the crisis probability increases. When a bank becomes
over-leveraged and invests in risky
household loans, it is effectively “gambling for resurrection.” If the gamble
pays off, a bank can generate high
returns for its equity holders. If the
gamble leads to a bad outcome, a bank
could be shut down, either by regulators or by bankruptcy. Of course, if a
shutdown is foreseen as likely regardless, equity holders cannot be further
penalized, so they may find it preferable to exploit the additional reward
from gambling on risky assets. In the
data that we have from 2003-2008,
that is precisely what we see.
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POLICY LESSONS
After the 2008 financial crisis,
executive branches and central banks
in advanced economies responded
by providing the banking sector with
additional guarantees on funding.
These included the Capital Purchase
Program (CPP) and the first round of
quantitative easing measures (QE1) in
the United States, and the long-term
refinancing operations (LTRO) in
Europe. The dominant policy rhetoric
was that poor bank balance sheets lay
behind the sharp reduction in credit.
Although policymakers intended for
banks to increase their lending to the
private sector, in many cases this did
not happen. In the U.S., institutions
that were included in the Capital Purchase Program did not increase their
loans.6 Similarly, other researchers
conclude that LTROs in Europe were
equally ineffective in boosting bank
lending.7
This behavior need not be puzzling. As our model suggests, we
can understand these interventions
through their impact on bank franchise value. Several of these policies
worked to provide banks with funding
at very favorable terms, in effect subsidizing the banking sector (CPP and
LTROs were explicitly designed to do
just that) and increasing the franchise
value of banks. These policies succeeded chiefly in reinforcing banks’
incentives to hold more safe assets.
A consequence of interventions
like QE1 was that banks could rely
on (relatively) more equity. This was
because with increased franchise values, default would trigger larger losses
for equity holders. As a result, this
policy intervention produced a decline
in expected bank failure rates.

However, the increased conservatism by equity holders also manifested
itself in the optimal portfolio composition of banks. In general, the optimal
asset composition subsequently tilted
more towards government bonds and
away from risky private loans. Only
poorly capitalized banks eschewed
this behavior to remain fully invested
in private sector loans. Thus, policies that effectively subsidized bank
equity holders by allowing them tap
debt markets at below-market rates
led many banks to reduce overall risk
taking. In the U.S., some researchers
describe a “flypaper effect” in which
banks chose to hold excess reserves
with the central bank rather than
expand credit to the private sector.8
This effect is particularly strong when
the likelihood of a crisis was high.
These findings add a fresh perspective to the ongoing debate about
the effects of unconventional monetary policies on bank lending. In
particular, they suggest an explanation
for the perceived limited success of
unconventional monetary policies in
stimulating bank credit to the private
sector during the economic recovery
after the recent financial crisis. Our
results are also consistent with other
evidence, which finds that U.S. banks
with mortgage-backed securities on
their books increased lending relative to their peers after QE1.9 These
banks, gambling for resurrection,
remained the most eager to replace
safe assets with risky ones.

CONCLUSIONS
While it may be plausible that
households, perhaps based on lack of
experience, over-optimism, or simply
rule-of-thumb behavior, took more
4

risk than, ex post, proved optimal in
the run-up to the 2008 crisis, it is
harder to believe that banks, en masse,
decided to lend to such households
purely based on over-optimism, as
observable economic conditions
worsened.
Our study suggests that reapplying recent policies toward banks
in a future crisis might have effects
counter to what is intended. A bank’s
decisions over time are driven by
fluctuations in its franchise value.
Methods to strengthen banks, while
conferring some long-run benefits,
might actually result in less lending if
they increase this franchise value. On
the flip side, any policy with the side
effect of weakening banks might actually result in more undesirable lending, and further bank instability, as
banks gamble for resurrection. In both
cases, ignoring the incentive effects of
policy on banks could itself exacerbate
underlying risks.
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